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The Dutch particle wel as a denial of a negation1  
 
Abstract  
In this paper I argue that all uses of the Dutch particle wel share a core meaning, namely 
that they mark a denial of a previous negation. To substantiate this claim I will analyze the 
different uses in an LDRT model (Geurts & Maier 2003). Spenader and Maier (to appear) 
show that this model allows denial and contrast to be analyzed in similar terms, which 
makes it very suitable for the purpose of this paper. 
 
1. Introduction 
Discourse particles are notoriously polysemous, which means that they typically have 
multiple related meanings or uses2. Dik (1988) distinguishes two different models for the 
relation between the meanings of polysemous words. In one model all the meanings of the 
word share a core-meaning. In the other model each member of the set of meanings shares 
at least one aspect of meaning with another member, but two non-adjacent members do not 
necessarily share any such aspect. I will show that the first model applies to the different 
uses of wel. At first sight the uses of wel are very diverse. However, I will show that the 
uses have in common that they are a denial of an implicit or explicit previous negation. 
This property is obvious when wel is used to contradict a previous negation as in (1). 
 
(1)  a. Jij heet   echt geen Jan-Peter!  
   you  have-name really  no Jan-Peter 
 ‘Your name isn’t Jan-Peter!’  
b. Ik heet wel  Jan-Peter!  
I have-name WEL Jan-Peter  
‘My name is Jan-Peter!’  
 
However, for other occurrences of wel this commonality is not apparent. Consider for 
example the use of wel in (2) and (3). 
 
                                                 
1 Many thanks to Emar Maier, Helen de Hoop and Anna Lobanova for their help and comments on earlier 
versions of this paper.  Remaining errors are my own.  
2 I use the terms use, meaning and function indiscriminately  
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(2) Ik  heb vandaag wel  honderd boten  geteld!  
I have today WEL hundred boats counted 
‘I have counted no less than a hundred boats today!’  
 
(3) Het feestje afgelopen zaterdag  was wel leuk  
the  party  last Saturday was WEL nice  
‘The party last Saturday was OK’  
 
In (2) the speaker indicates by using the word wel that he thinks hundred boats is a lot. In 
(3) here the speaker says that the party was OK, neither good nor bad. Wel functions as a 
moderator to the predicate leuk ‘nice’, and weakens its meaning. The function of being a 
denial of a negation is not immediately clear from these examples. 
Despite this apparent diversity of the functions of wel, I argue that they share a 
core-meaning. I will show that all uses of wel are a denial of a previous negation. Denial is 
analyzed as a down-date of the common ground in Layered Discourse Representation 
Theory. I show that four of five uses of wel I distinguish, indeed involve retraction of some 
information from the common ground. In the next section I will give an overview of the 
different uses of wel. In section 3 I introduce the framework of Layered Discourse 
Representation Theory and in section 4 I discuss the analysis of denial and contrast in 
Layered Discourse Representation Theory by Spenader and Maier (to appear). In section 5 
I will analyze the uses of wel in line with this approach.   
 
2. The functions of the particle wel   
In this section I will shortly discuss the different uses of wel that I distinguished by means 
of the Spoken Dutch Corpus (for a more elaborate description of the different uses and the 
methods used I refer the reader to Hogeweg (2009)). The following five basic uses of 
functions are discerned, some consisting of subtypes: 
 
- Wel corrects a previous negative utterance 
- Wel marks a relation of explicit contrast 
- Wel marks a relation of implicit contrast 
- Wel marks surprise by the speaker about the content of his 
utterance 
- Wel functions as a modifier similar to a double negation  
 
In this section I discuss each of the functions and their subtypes and I will illustrate the 
different uses with examples from the corpus.  
The first function of wel I will call correction and is illustrated in (4). In (4) the 
adverb wel is used to contradict a previous negative utterance, as was the case in (1). Prior 
to utterance (4) a boy said to his brother over the telephone that he tried to call him at 
Floor’s but he was not there. Then the brother says: 
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(4)  Ik zit wel bij Floor 
 I sit WEL at Floor 
‘I am at Floor’s’ 
 
Another function of wel is to mark a relation of contrast between two items. This 
function is named explicit contrast. Utterance (5) was part of a news item about a flood in 
Poland and it was preceded by the information that in Warsaw the situation was not that 
bad.  
 
(5)  In het zuiden van Polen is de toestand wel zorgelijk 
 in  the south of Poland is the situation WEL alarming 
         ‘In the south of Poland the situation is alarming’ 
 
In (5) the adverb wel is uttered to mark the contrastive relation between Warsaw where the 
situation is not that bad and the current utterance that states that in the south of Poland the 
situation is alarming.  
Wel is also used to mark a possible discrepancy between the common ground 
brought about by the preceding conversation, and the current utterance. I will refer to this 
function as implicit contrast. Wel is not used to contradict an explicit denial of a certain 
fact but to respond to an assumption that could be inferred from the conversation thus far. 
Example (6) is part of a conversation between a mother and a daughter about a paper the 
daughter handed in for school. The daughter was not satisfied with the quality of her paper 
and she lists a number of things that she could have done better. After that she utters (6). 
 
(6) Ik had wel best wel veel bronnen  
 I have WEL quite WEL many sources 
            ‘I did have quite a lot of sources3’ 
 
In (6) the first occurrence of the adverb wel is used to mark the inconsistency with the 
foregoing and the current utterance. The aforementioned quality of the paper could suggest 
that she did not have a lot of sources or at least makes that a more plausible option than the 
contrary. Wel is used as a reaction to that expectation. 
In some occurrences wel seems to bring about a sense of surprise. In general, the 
uses of wel I am grouping under the name surprise occur in a context in which the contrary 
of the sentence containing wel is more plausible or normal. This context is often a very 
general, which means not brought about by the previous conversation or the current 
                                                 
3 The paraphrases of (5) and (6) show that the English expression of the functions explicit and implicit 
contrast involves stressing the main verb. A detailed comparison of the use of wel and VERUM-focus (Höhle 
1992) would be an interesting topic for further research.  
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surroundings. The occurrences can be subdivided into three classes. The first one is when 
wel co-occurs with the verb lijken ‘look like/seem’: 
 
(7) Het lijkt  wel een sollicitatiegesprek 
 it looks-like WEL a job-interview 
        ‘It looks like a job interview’  
 
Utterance (7) is part of a radio interview. This was obviously not a job interview but at 
some point it appeared to have become one to the person who uttered (7), to his surprise. 
The effect that this use of the modal particle wel brings about can be clearly illustrated by 
the following (constructed) sentence pair. 
 
(8) Dat kind lijkt  wel een beetje op mijn buurman 
 that child looks-like WEL a little  at my
 neighbour 
           ‘That child looks a little like my neighbour’ 
 
(9) ?Dat kind  lijkt  wel een beetje op zijn moeder 
 that child looks-like WEL a little  at his mother 
         ‘That child looks a little like its mother’ 
 
The utterance of wel in (9) is strange because it is very normal for children to look like 
their mother. Wel can be uttered in (8) because it is not normal or usual for children to look 
like people they are not related to. The second subclass of wel indicating surprise is 
exemplified in (10), the focus particle wel occurs in front of a quantifier and it indicates 
that the speaker considers the quantity to be higher than expected. This wel also adds an 
element of surprise to the sentence or a sense that the situation is extraordinary.  
 
(10) Heel breed  inzetbaar want  die speelde
 wel 
 very broadly employable because he played 
 WEL 
vijf  rollen 
five parts  
‘Very versatile because he played (no less than) five parts’ 
 
In (10) the speaker indicates that he thinks playing five parts is a lot. Wel indicating 
surprise also occurs with the word misschien ‘maybe’: 
 
(11) Misschien komen die ook nog wel 
 maybe  come they also PRT WEL 
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‘Maybe they will come too’ 
 
Adding this wel brings about the meaning that the situation expressed in the sentence is not 
likely to happen or to be the case. Example (11) without wel would be uttered if one would 
for instance have spoken to the people in question and they had said they might come. 
When wel is added this indicates that the speaker has no indication they will come but ‘you 
never know’.   
 In the remainder of this section I will discuss the last function of wel. The last 
function of wel differs from the aforementioned functions. Wel does not occur in a context 
in which the opposite of the sentence containing wel is stated or implicated or even more 
plausible. Consider example (12). The modal particle wel is used in front of the predicate 
leuk ‘nice’ and it has the effect that it decreases the positivity of the modifier leuk ‘nice’.  
 
(12) Ja ‘ t was wel leuk 
 yes it was WEL nice 
           ‘Yes, it was OK’ 
 
Example (12) does not require a context that implicates that it was not nice nor is it the 
case that from world knowledge we know that things are normally not nice. The effect wel 
brings about is similar to the effect of litotes. Let me clarify this effect with the help of 
example (12). Let us assume the scale of “nice-ness” includes three states; nice, neutral 
and not nice. When not nice is used in a contradictory opposition to nice, it covers the 
range neutral and nice on the nice-ness scale. When one says something was not nice 
however, that mostly implicates it was the opposite (or contrary) of nice. When one makes 
use of a double negation, there is a different effect. What is literally expressed by not not 
nice encloses the states nice and neutral. What may be implicated by that utterance though 
is covered by the neutral state for the biggest part (Blutner 2004). The same effect is 
visible when wel is used. When someone utters the party was ‘wel’ nice that implicates he 
found the party somewhere in between neutral and a little bit nice. This effect is visualized 
in figure 1(based on Blutner 2004). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Implicated 
range of not 
nice
Literal range of not not nice 
nice not niceneutral 
Implicated range of not 
not nice/ wel nice 
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Figure 1: not not/wel nice 
 
When the modal particle wel is used in combination with eens ‘once’ there is also nothing 
in the context that indicates the opposite. Together the two words mean ‘once (in a while)’ 
or ‘ever’. Consider example (13). There does not have to be anything from which the 
speaker infers that the hearer has not seen ‘him’ in Goede Tijden Slechte Tijden. 
 
(13) Heb jij 'm wel eens gezien in Goede Tijden Slechte  
 have you him WEL once seen in good times bad  
Tijden? 
times 
‘Have you ever seen him in (the Dutch soap opera) Goede Tijden Slechte 
Tijden?’ 
 
Wel and eens are a fixed combination, sometimes they are even written as one word; 
weleens. The frequency that is expressed by wel eens, is less than the frequency expressed 
by soms ‘sometimes’. Here wel has a similar effect as in the previous use. Wel denies the 
possibility of not once. On a (simplified) scale of frequency this leaves open the ranges 
once, sometimes, often and always. Wel eens indicates that the frequency lies just above 
not once, namely once or sometimes.   
Wel has a similar function when it occurs with the verb zullen ‘will’. When it 
occurs with zullen, the modal particle wel indicates that the speaker considers the content 
of his utterance very plausible but he cannot be totally sure about its truth. With zal wel in 
(14) the speaker seems to indicate that based on the information available to him, he can 
draw a certain conclusion, but that he is aware of the fact that the available information is 
not sufficient to be certain. 
 
(14)  ’t Is woensdag en het is voor kerstmis
 dus 
 it  is Wednesday and it is before Christmas
 so 
 zal wel koopavond  uh zijn  
 will WEL late-night-shopping uh be 
‘It’s Wednesday and it is before Christmas so there will probably be late 
night shopping today’ 
 
Example (14) does not require a context in which the reverse is stated or more plausible. 
This use is similar to the uses illustrated in (12) and (13). In this case, however, there are 
only two points on the scale. Either there will be late night shopping on Wednesday or not. 
It cannot be neither or somewhere in between. Taking the available evidence into 
consideration the speaker chooses the option that there will be late night shopping.  
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In this section I discussed 5 different functions of the particle wel and I indicated 
that all uses of wel function as a denial of a negation. To substantiate this claim I will 
analyze the functions in a formal model that can handle both monotonic as well as non-
monotonic effects on a discourse, namely Layered Discourse Representation Theory 
(LDRT). Maier and Spenader (to appear) show that, adopting an LDRT framework, 
contrast and denial can be analyzed as being similar phenomena. I will therefore start by 
discussing their analysis and LDRT in section 3 after which I will relate their theory to my 
analysis of wel in section 4.  
 
3. Contrast as denial in Layered Discourse Representation Theory 
Spenader and Maier (to appear) analyze contrast and denial as similar phenomenon within 
Layered Discourse Representation Theory (Geurts & Maier 2003). They build on Maier 
and van der Sandt’s (2003) treatment of denial. In Maier and van der Sandt (2003) denial is 
analyzed as a non-monotonic mechanism on the discourse structure previously established. 
Parts of the contribution of the previous utterance are removed from the main DRS and end 
up under the scope of a negation introduced by the denial. This mechanism is called 
Reverse Anaphora. Note that a denial is not the same as a negation. One speaks of a denial 
when it is used to object to a previous utterance. Positive sentences can function as a denial 
as well. A denial can be used (amongst others) to reject a proposition, as in (15), a 
presupposition, as in (16) or an implicature, as in (17) (Maier and van der Sandt 2003). 
 
(15)  a. Mary is not happy (as a reaction to the utterance ‘Mary is happy’)  
b. Mary is happy (as a reaction to the utterance that ‘Mary is not happy’) 
 
(16) The king of France is not bald, France doesn’t have a king 
 
(17) It is not possible, it is necessary that the pope is right 
 
In order to model the fact that denials can target different kinds of content they adopt a 
Layered DRT framework where these different types of informational content are all stored 
in separate but interconnected layers of a single representational structure. In LDRT every 
type of information (e.g. presupposition or implicature) has its own label. The syntax of 
LDRT is similar to that of regular DRT except for the fact that in LDRT every discourse 
referent and every DRS condition comes with a label, specifying what kind of information 
it encodes. Now there can be directed reverse anaphora, which only removes the offensive 
material, that is, the material that is contradictory and needs to be removed from the 
LDRS. 
While denial is usually treated ad a non-monotonic phenomenon, contrast is 
normally not analyzed as causing a revision of the common ground. However, Spenader 
and Maier (to appear) argue that contrast and denial should be treated as the same 
phenomenon. Spenader and Maier assume that speakers and hearers maintain a 
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representation of the discourse in which they are involved that with each new utterance can 
be 'updated' (information is added) or 'downdated', a  slight modification of Maier and van 
der Sandt’s (2003) Reverse Anaphora mechanism used to retract information. A denial is 
analyzed as having three steps (Spenader and Maier, to appear).  
  
Issue: the common ground representation is incremented with the first speaker’s utterance 
Concession: the second speaker optionally concedes that part of the informational content 
conveyed (or suggested) by the first speaker’s utterance is true and this information is 
added to the representation as well 
Correction: the actual denial, usually consisting of some negative particle or negated echo 
of the utterance to be corrected, or if there were a concession, a but or however, etc. 
Normal update with the correction would result in an inconsistent representation, so we 
apply a downdate, throwing out as much of the earlier information as needed to restore 
consistency. The informational content of the correction (apart from any echoes which 
make no semantic contribution) and of the concession always remain untouched by the 
downdate. 
 
A condition on denial is that it operates on something already given in the 
discourse. Upon recognizing the speaker’s intention to deny, the hearer starts looking for 
information in the context that conflicts with the content of the denial. Spenader and Maier 
see a contrastive conjunction as an operator that triggers revision of the discourse 
representation. The semantic relationship holding between the different parts of contrastive 
relationships must fulfil certain criteria. The main criteria on the semantic relationship for 
the use of a contrastive marker is that there is some unspecified implication derived from 
the second conjunct that contradicts with the first conjunct or an inference derived from 
this first conjunct. This inference is called Tertium Comparationis (TC) by Spenader and 
Maier. In case of direct contrast, the inference is the negation of the first conjunct. In case 
of indirect contrast the identification of the inference requires world-knowledge. So, 
contrast involves a denial of a hidden implication of the first conjunct (either directly or 
indirectly) and it involves the same three steps as denial (Spenader and Maier, to appear): 
 
Issue: the topic under discussion, the context 
Concession: the information contributed by the first conjunct, a partial answer to a 
contextual question, a confirmation of some information. 
Correction: the information contributed by the second conjunct. It initiates a search 
process for conflicting implications, a TC. This TC is likely an implication of the first 
conjunct, interpreted with respect to the issue. 
 
Spenader and Maier formalize their view on contrast in LDRT. Their analysis 
requires four layers: a Fregean layer (fr), a layer for (generalized) implicatures (imp), a 
layer for accommodated presuppositions (pr) and a layer for contextual information (k). To 
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be able to explain contrast they introduce an additional layer: inf for pragmatic/relevance-
based inferences. The difference between inferences and generalized implicatures is that 
inferences are less uniquely identifiable than generalized implicatures, which are 
calculable in a predictable way from the implicature trgiggering expression.  
The concession together with the issue brings about such a pragmatic inference. 
Consider sentence (18) (Spenader and Maier, to appear): 
 
 (18) I was hungry, but the restaurants were closed.  
 
Say this sentence was uttered by Yan and there is an implicit issue Did you (Yan) eat? The 
issue can be represented as follows: 
 
[xk|yank(x), eat?fr(x)] 
 
Now Yan utters the first conjunct of (18), which is the concession. This partial answer 
(against the background of the issue and the assumption of a cooperative speaker) evokes 
the pragmatic inference that Yan ate. The DRS now looks as follows: 
 
→ [xk| yank (x), eat?fr (x), ateinf (x)] 
 
The second conjunct of (18), the correction, brings about the inference that Yan has not 
eaten. Updating the DRS with that assertion and its inference would lead to inconsistency. 
That’s why a downdate is required. Note that while Maier and van der Sandt (2003) 
assume that the entire layer with the offensive material is removed, Spenader and Maier 
argue that only as much is removed as is needed to maintain a coherent common ground. 
 
→ [xk| yank (x), eat?fr (x), ateinf (x)]   [xk, Xk|yank (x), restaurantsk (X), closedfr (X), 
¬infateinf(x)] → [xk, Xk| yank (x), eat?fr (x), ateinf (x), restaurantsk (X), closedfr (X), 
¬infateinf(x)]   
 
In conclusion, Spenader and Maier give a unifying account of contrast and denial by 
analyzing the first as a subtype of the latter. Contrast and denial have the same underlying 
structure and (non-monotonic) discourse effects, they only differ in the type of information 
they affect. While a denial removes information that has been asserted (fr), presupposed 
(pr) or implicated (imp), contrast involves removal of pragmatically inferred information 
(in the inf layer). I argue that all uses of wel share a core meaning, namely that they mark a 
denial of a previous negation. To substantiate this claim I will analyze the different uses in 
the LDRT model outlined above. Since this model allows correction and contrast to be 
analyzed in similar terms, it is very suitable for my analysis of the core-meaning of wel.  
 
4. The functions of wel in LDRT 
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4.1 Correction 
The use of wel I called correction is identical to the operation of denial as defined by Maier 
and van der Sandt (2003). They argue that a denial does not have to include a negation. 
Indeed, wel marks that a previous (negative) statement must be removed from the common 
ground and must be replaced by its negation.    
 
4.2 Explicit and implicit contrast  
I argue that implicit contrast and explicit contrast constitute two different relations. The 
difference between explicit and implicit contrast corresponds to the distinction that is 
sometimes made between semantic opposition and denial of expectation (in the 
terminology of Lakoff 1971).  I will therefore shortly discuss some of the literature that 
concerns the difference between semantic opposition and denial of expectation. It has been 
argued that the two relations should be differentiated. For example, Kehler (2002) makes a 
fundamental distinction between the two. Kehler argues that all coherence relations belong 
to three general categories: cause-effect relations, resemblance relations and contiguity 
relations. One of the cause-effect relations Kehler identifies is violated expectation which 
corresponds to denial of expectation. 
 
Violated Expectation:  Infer P from the assertion of S0 and Q from the 
assertion of S1, where normally P → ¬Q. 
 
An example of a sentence pair between which this relation exists is: 
 
 (19)  Bill was about to be impeached, but he didn’t call his lawyer 
   
In Kehler’s categorization of coherence relations between sentences contrast (which 
corresponds to semantic opposition) is a subtype of the resemblance relation. Kehler 
argues that the recognition of resemblance requires that commonalities and contrasts 
among corresponding sets of entities and relations are recognized. Kehler gives two 
definitions of what he calls contrast. In the first, exemplified in (23) the relations expressed 
by the utterances are contrasted. In the second definition, exemplified in (24), a set of 
parallel entities is contrasted (accented words are italicized).  
 
 (20) Gephard supported Gore, but Armey opposed him 
 
(21) Gephard supported Gore, but Armey supported Bush  
 
Another advocate of distinguishing between the two relations which I call implicit contrast 
and explicit contrast, is Malchukov (2004) who argues that there are languages that use 
different markers to express the different relations  
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However, many scholars argue that both relations (explicit contrast or semantic 
opposition versus implicit contrast or denial of expectation) can be captured by one 
definition (e.g. Winter and Rimon (1994), Foolen (1993), Spenader (2004)). For example, 
Winter and Rimon argue that both types of the contrastive conjunction p con q are 
felicitous in a given context if there is a statement r such that p implies not(r) and q implies 
r (q denies not(r)).  Spenader and Maier (to appear) also consider both types to involve the 
same operation of removal of an inference from the common ground. Although they do 
state that semantic opposition examples usually depend more on the context than 
traditional denial of expectation examples.   
 I argue that the relations I have labeled explicit contrast and implicit contrast have 
a similar underlying semantics, namely that they remove information from the context. 
However, there is a difference between the two relations. In the case of explicit contrast the 
concession is a partial positive or negative answer to the question or issue in the context, 
while in case of implicit contrast the concession evokes a pragmatic inference that is a 
positive or negative answer to the question in the context. To clarify this I will first 
elaborate somewhat on the notion issue.  
 Spenader and Maier (t.a.) argue that the context is very important in finding a 
Tertium Comparationis. The concession evokes a certain inference only with respect to the 
issue in the context. A similar restriction was argued for by Umbach (2005). Umbach too, 
argues for one notion of contrast. However, she argues that accounts like that of Winter 
and Rimon, that see but as an indication of violated expectations (the expectation being 
based on default world knowledge) cannot be right. Umbach argues that a but-sentence is 
an appropriate answer to an implicit or explicit question that consists of two conjuncts of 
which one will be confirmed and the other one denied. Consider example (22). 
 
 (22) a. Adam: Did John clean up his room and wash the dishes?  
   b. Ben: [yes] John cleaned up his room and [yes] he washed the dishes.  
   c. #[yes] John cleaned up his room, but [yes] he washed the dishes.  
   d. #[no] John didn't clean up his room, but [no] he didn't wash the dishes.  
   e. [yes] John cleaned up his room, but [no] he didn't wash the dishes.  
   f. [yes] John cleaned up his room, but [no] he skipped the washing-up.  
   g. [no] John didn't clean up his room, but [yes] he did the washing-up. 
 
If the answer to both conjuncts of the question in (22) is positive, as in (22c), using but 
instead of and is not felicitous. If the answers are both negative, as in (22d) but cannot be 
used either. Only if the answer to one of the conjuncts is positive, while the other is 
negative, but is perfectly acceptable. Umbach distinguishes between four classes of but-
conjunctions: (i) the subjects of the conjuncts are the same and the predicates differ from 
each other, (ii) the predicates are the same and the subjects differ from each other, (iii) both 
subjects and predicates are different yet comparable and (iiii) subjects and predicates are 
not comparable to each other, we have to compare entire propositions. In the last case, 
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exemplified in (23), the entire propositions in the conjuncts are alternatives with respect to 
each other. Sentence (23a) and (23b) are answers to the question in (23c). In (23a) one part 
of the question is explicitly negated, in (23b) it has to be reconstructed.  
 
 (23) a. It is raining but we are not going to stay at home 
   b. It is raining but we are going to go for a walk 
   c. Is it raining and are we going to stay at home?  
 
Let us now return to the analysis of wel. While Umbach (2005) argues that a contrastive 
relation is established in answer to a twofold question. Spenader and Maier give a singular 
question as an example of an issue.  I think the difference between a twofold question as an 
issue and a singular question as an issue is precisely what distinguishes between explicit 
and implicit contrast. Consider example (24). 
 
 (24)  Piet deed de afwas niet maar John wel 
   ‘Piet didn’t do the dishes but John did’ 
 
Let us see whether we can analyze the explicit contrastive relation in the conjunction in 
(24) as an answer to the question: Did John do the dishes? In that case this question would 
be the issue, the first conjunct of (24) would be the concession and the second conjunct the 
denial. However, I think there are two distinct interpretations of this sentence, namely the 
explicit contrastive reading (when the sentence answers the question Did Piet and John do 
the dishes?) and the implicit contrastive reading (when the sentence answers the question 
Did John do the dishes?). I therefore assume that there are indeed two types of contrast, 
but they share the property that they remove information from the context.   
 In line with Umbach (2005), I argue that two conjuncts that establish an explicit 
contrastive relation (with wel) are answers to a twofold questions (are Piet and John 
coming) or one question that entails two question (Is your band coming? entails Is Piet 
coming? and Is John coming?). However, then it cannot be the case that the first conjunct 
evokes some inference r and the second conjunct evokes or is the negation of r. If you ask: 
Komt je band? ‘Is your band coming’ and the answer is Piet komt niet ‘Piet is not coming’ 
maar John komt wel ‘but John ís coming’, you cannot argue that Piet’s not coming raises 
the expectation that the band is not coming while John’s coming implicates that the band is 
coming. That is, the overall answer to the question must still be: no, the band is not 
coming. This is similar for a twofold question: Komen Piet en John? ‘are Piet and John 
coming?’ with the answer Piet komt niet maar John komt wel ‘Piet is not coming but John 
is’. The overall answer (if there is any) must still be that no, the couple Piet and John is not 
coming.  
 I argue that in the case of an explicit contrastive relation there is a question (an 
issue) like Did Piet and John do the dishes? which suggests that Piet and John are similar 
with respect to the predicate doing the dishes. A question like Did Piet and John do the 
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dishes? can have a proper twofold question interpretation, which treats Piet and John 
independently. However, it can also have a simple polar interpretation, which groups Piet 
and John together.The semantics of questions is often said to be the set of possible 
answers. This is defined by Krifka (1999) as follows: 
 
(25) The meaning of a question […WH…] is the set of propositions  denoted by […α…] 
where  α ranges over the sort of the question  constituent WH 
 
In case of a polarity question the truth value of the proposition could be seen as the 
question constituent. The meaning of the question Did Piet and John do the dishes? is the 
set of possible answers {Piet did the dishes and John did the dishes, Piet did the dishes and 
John didn’t do the dishes, Piet didn’t do the dishes and John did the dishes, Piet and John 
didn’t do the dishes} but in a context that favors the polar interpretation, it is the set of the 
two answers {Piet and John did the dishes, Piet and John didn’t do the dishes}. If we 
assume a two-fold question as the issue of the contrastive relation in (24), what should be 
considered the concession and the correction? One could argue that because of the first 
conjunct Piet didn’t do the dishes, the expectation is evoked that John didn’t do the dishes 
either, because Piet and John are grouped together. However, in that case the first conjunct 
can not be analyzed as a concession because it answers a different question (the first 
conjunct would then answer the question Did Piet do the dishes? whereas the second 
conjunct would answer the question Did John do the dishes?). The first conjunct can not 
function as the issue to the second conjunct either because then there would be no issue 
against which the first conjunct evokes the negation of the second conjunct. If both 
conjuncts are analyzed as answers to the same question (Did Piet and John do the dishes?) 
the first conjunct can be analyzed as a concession to the assumption that Piet and John are 
similar (with respect to doing the dishes). That is, the first conjunct on its own does not 
suggest that Piet and John are similar but at this point it is still a possibility. Furthermore, 
the concession further specifies this suggestion. Whereas, before the first conjunct two 
possible answers are suggested {Piet and John did the dishes, Piet and John didn’t do the 
dishes}, after the first conjunct this is narrowed down to {Piet and John didn’t do the 
dishes} and it is this suggestion that is removed from the inference layer by the use of wel. 
 In conclusion, the difference between explicit and implicit contrast is that in the 
case of implicit contrast, the issue is a singular question and the concession evokes an 
inference based on the issue and world-knowledge. In case of an explicit contrast, the issue 
suggests two possible situations which are narrowed down to one by the concession. Note 
that for explicit contrast the inference is not only suggested to be true it is also already 
partly confirmed. The inference Piet and John didn’t do the dishes is already partly 
confirmed by the utterance that Piet didn’t do the dishes. So part of it is already present in 
the Fregean layer. Note that the part in the Fregean layer does not have to be removed 
because the new information is not in conflict with just this part.  
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4.3 Wel as a surprise marker 
Wel indicating surprise marks that the speaker suspected the negation of the proposition 
expressed by the sentence containing wel. This suspicion is not based on the current 
discourse but rather on more general expectations about the world.  
 Zeevat (this volume) discusses only as a mirative particle. He argues that only 
indicates surprise by the speaker about the small size of a particular quantity. The 
semantics of mirativity is defined as a presupposed expectation that is asserted to be false. 
Zeevat argues that mirative markers can be used for corrections but the expectation may 
also be much weaker than the belief of the speaker (or the common ground, or of a second 
speaker). Zeevat argues that only triggers a weak presupposition (p. 3): The presupposed 
expectation can be common ground, it can be the speaker’s or the hearer’s or they can be 
the expectation of a third party or a possible third party. The weakest possible expectation 
is “there might be somebody who might think that A”. The presupposition mechanism tries 
to find the weak presuppositions in the common ground and in the opinions of highly 
activated persons, but also allows suggestions and attitudes by other people as antecedents 
and can in the last resort just assume that there could be someone who accepts the weak 
presupposition. 
 According to Zeevat, the notion weak presupposition can be implemented by a 
variant of regular presupposition. When a weak presupposition occurs, the context is 
searched for accessible antecedents. Only now two additional possibilities for antecedents 
are added. The first new option is the possibility to find antecedents in subordinate 
contexts which are introduced by positive attitude and modal operators. The second option 
is that the antecedent can be inferred from the context. The hearer should search for a 
reason to think not p by looking for an r such if r then normally not p. If even the last two 
options provide no suitable antecedent, the uncontroversial “it might be thought that p” 
might be added to the context, instead of normal accommodation or a failure of the update.  
 Wel also marks surprise and could therefore be classified as a weak presupposition 
trigger. We saw that wel as a marker of implicit contrast removes an inference from the 
LDRS and as such can also be classified as a weak presupposition trigger. Wel as a marker 
of surprise is weaker because the inference it denies is not caused by the discourse thus far 
but by more general knowledge about the world. Nonetheless, this information is part of 
the common ground. The nature of this common ground, however, is such that it is less 
dependent on the particular conversation. The same information may be common ground 
in all conversations of people who share the same world view or culture. I propose to 
formalize this type of presupposition as a default inference. Default inferences bear the 
same label as inferences made on the basis of a particular proposition. The difference lays 
in the fact that wel as surprise is not dependent on a certain issue, nor is there a concession. 
As we saw, for the contrastive relation, the immediate context (the issue) is very important. 
Furthermore, in case of contrast, a concession is present which suggests an r or a Tertium 
Comparationis. When wel marks surprise, these two requirements are not met. Therefore, 
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it cannot be said to mark a contrastive relation. However, the fact that it does remove an 
inference shows that it bears family resemblance to this relation. 
 
4.4 Wel as a modifier 
The last use of wel differs fundamentally from the aforementioned uses since it does not 
involve retraction of any information from the context. The contribution containing this 
wel constitutes a monotonic update of the common ground. Nonetheless, I assume this use 
of wel shares the core-meaning of a denial of a negation because its pragmatic effect is 
similar to that of a double negation, or litotes. Interestingly, in case of a double negation 
the first negation often functions as contradictory negation and the second as a contrary 
negation; (not unhappy = contradictory (contrary (happy))) (Horn (1989). A denial always 
forms a contradictory opposition with the proposition being denied. This indicates that this 
use of wel indeed constitutes a denial of a negation. I suggest this can be analyzed as 
having two negations in the Fregean layer, which then brings about the pragmatic effect as 
described in section 2.  
 
5. Conclusion  
I have argued that the different functions of the discourse particle wel share a core-
meaning, namely that they are a denial of a negation. Adapting an LDRT framework, I 
showed that four of the five functions of wel involve retraction of some information from 
the context. Crucial to the use of wel, is that this information contains a negation. The last 
use of wel functions as a denial of a negation within one turn in conversation and has a 
pragmatic effect on the meaning of the utterance.  
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